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I. INTRODUCTION
Two or more persons often have the right to control the conduct
of oil and gas exploration and production activities or share in the costs
and profits associated therewith. In Louisiana, these operations, which
may be referred to broadly as joint oil and gas operations, arise in
three ways: (a) through co-ownership; (b) through orders of the Com-
missioner of Conservation pooling separately owned tracts; and (c) by
agreement. This paper addresses the operating rights and liabilities of
the participants in such operations in each of these contexts.
II. Co-OwNERSHI
A. Definition of Co-Ownership
The three basic rights available in Louisiana to explore for and
develop oil and gas deposits are ownership of (1) the land, (2) the
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mineral servitude and (3) the mineral lease,' the latter two being mineral
rights which derive from absolute fee ownership. 2 Each of these rights
is susceptible of co-ownership, a relationship which exists between two
or more persons who own the same thing in indivision, that is, an
undivided share of the whole.
3
From this requirement of common ownership of the same thing, it
follows that co-ownership does not exist between the owner of the land
and the owner of a mineral right in the land or between the owners
of different mineral rights in the same property, e.g., between the owner
of a mineral servitude and the owner of a mineral lease thereon.
4 It
also follows that the owner of a mineral right obtained from a co-
owner of land will not be in co-ownership with the owner of a mineral
right obtained from a different co-owner of the same land. Likewise,
the owner of a mineral lease acquired from a co-owner of a mineral
servitude is not in co-ownership with the owner of a mineral lease
acquired from a different co-owner of the same servitude. In such
circumstances, the operating rights of the mineral right owner should
be no greater than the operating rights of the interest from which those
rights derived.
B. Co-Ownership of Land
The law of co-ownership of mineral rights derives from the law of
co-ownership of land which, in turn, developed by analogy to the law
of partnership.' However, unlike a partnership, which could only be
created by agreement, co-ownership was often created by operation of
law, such as in a succession, and courts, quite appropriately, declined
to impose fiduciary duties between co-owners. 6 The rights and duties of
co-owners, 7 many of which are seemingly opposed to one another,
evolved on a case by case basis.
1. La. R.S. 31:8, 31:21, 31:114 (1989).
2. See George Den6gre, Co-Ownership of Oil & Gas Interests in Louisiana, 24 Tul.
L. Rev. 288 (1950); Edwin K. Hunter, Co-Ownership Under The Mineral Code, 22nd
Ann. Inst. on Min. L. 137, 138 (1975). Ownership of mineral rights, immovable property
such as leases and servitudes, must be distinguished from ownership of actual produced
oil and gas, movables that are not owned until they are reduced to possession. La. R.S.
31:6 (1989).
3. La. Civ. Code art. 480.
4. La. R.S. 31:169 (1989).
5. See Smith v. Wilson, 10 La. Ann. 255 (1855).
6. See Emerson v. Shirley, 188 La. 196, 175 So. 909 (1937).
7. For a general discussion of the rights and duties of co-owners, see Smith, 10
La. Ann. 255; George Denkgre, Comment, Ownership in Indivision in Louisiana, 22 Tul.
L. Rev. 611 (1948).
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Historically, a co-owner in possession of land was permitted to
occupy the property free of rent,' and had the duty to care for the
property as if it were his own, 9 but he was denied the right to do any
work on the property which would alter its character without the unan-
imous consent of all co-owners.' 0 However, the courts generally refused
to enjoin a co-owner in possession who wished to make a natural use
of the property," such as the cultivation of a plantation.' 2 All co-owners
participated in the fruits and revenues of an enterprise conducted on
the property." The co-owner in possession had the duty to account 4
to the other co-owners for the profit derived from the enterprise and
was not entitled to charge for his labor." The remedy of a co-owner
who disapproved of such an operation was to apply for a partition of
the property. 6 Although a co-owner was liable to another co-owner for
expenses necessary for preservation, 7 one co-owner had no liability to
a third party for obligations incurred by the other co-owner relative to
the property, even for necessary improvements; and where both co-
owners contracted with a third party for work on the property, they
were liable jointly, not in solido.'s Act 990 of 1990, effective January
1, 1991, codified these principles in articles 797-818 of the Louisiana
Civil Code.' 9
C. Co-Ownership of Mineral Rights
1. Historically
The courts followed the foregoing principles of co-ownership with
some deviations in deciding cases involving oil and gas exploration and
8. Juneau v. Laborde, 228 La. 410, 82 So. 2d 693 (1955).
9. E.g., Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Liles, 16 La. App. 500, 133 So. 835 (2d
Cir. 1931).
10. E.g., Cotten v. Christen, 110 La. 444, 34 So. 597 (1903). Interestingly, the co-
ownership rule of unanimity regarding the use of real property developed by analogy to
the now abolished rule that a partner could make no change in real property without
consent of the other partners. See La. Civ. Code art. 2870 (1870) (revised and reenacted
1980; source of current La. Civ. Code arts. 2807, 2814).
11. Dendgre, supra note 7, at 615.
12. Stinson v. Marston, 185 La. 365, 169 So. 436 (1936).
13. E.g., Vance v. Sentell, 178 La. 749, 152 So. 513 (1934) (on rehearing).
14. Id.
15. Conrad v. Burbank, 25 La. Ann. 112 (1873).
16. George Den6gre, Comment, Ownership in Indivision in Louisiana, 22 Tul. L.
Rev..611, 613 (1948).
17. E.g., Moody v. Arabie, 498 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1986); Moreira v. Schwan, 113
La. 643, 37 So. 542 (1904); Smith v. Wilson, 10 La. Ann. 255 (1855).
18. Suthon v. Laws, 127 La. 531, 53 So. 852 (La. 1910).
19. See Thomas A. Harrell, Co-Ownership in Light of the New Articles of the Civil
Code, 38th Ann. Inst. on Min. L. (forthcoming 1991).
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production. Although courts repeatedly stated that a co-owner had the
right to prevent other co-owners from exploiting the property for oil
and gas, 20 in United Gas Public Service Co. v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe
Line Co.,21 a co-owner whose oil and gas operations on neighboring
property were draining the common property requested the court to
enjoin another co-owner's drilling operation on the common property,
but the court refused3 2 A co-owner's consent to operations was not
required to be in writing and could be tacit, 23 but was not alone tan-
tamount to an agreement to share costs.24
As soon as oil or gas was severed from the ground it became the
joint property of the co-owners.25 However, a nonparticipating co-owner
was not entitled to share in the production until his share of the cost
of drilling and completing the well was recouped out of production,
even though he had no personal liability for those costs.2 6 An operating
co-owner could not obtain a money judgment against a nonoperating
co-owner for unsuccessful efforts to restore production and was limited
to recovering his costs and expenses out of production. 7 An exception
existed where these costs were incurred in connection with a well that
for several years had provided net returns to a nonparticipating co-
owner greater than the costs sought to be recovered.2
Co-ownership was distinguished from a nonexclusive mineral right
in Clark v. Tensas Delta Land Co.29 In Clark, the court held that a
mineral servitude covering less than one hundred percent of the minerals
20. E.g., Sun Oil Co. v. State Mineral Bd., 231 La. 689, 92 So. 2d 583 (1956); Gulf
Ref. Co. v. Carroll, 145 La. 299, 82 So. 277 (1919).
21. 176 La. 1024, 147 So. 66 (1932).
22. In Ree Corp. v. Shaffer, 246 So. 2d 313 (La. App. ist Cir. 1971), aff'd, 261
La. 502, 260 So. 2d 307 (1972), the court suggested that United Gas was based upon
principles of equity rather than any legal right of a co-owner to utilize the common
property.
23. Connette v. Wright, 154 La. 1081, 98 So. 674 (1923).
24. See Sterling v. McKendrick, 134 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
25. See Allies Oil Co. v. Ayers, 152 La. 19, 92 So. 720 (1922).
26. E.g., Huckabay v. Texas Co., 227 La. 191, 78 So. 2d 829 (1955); Allies, 152
La. 19, 92 So. 720; Martel v. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate, 114 La. 351, 38 So. 253
(1905); Scott v. Hunt Oil Co., 152 So. 2d 599 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963). However, in
Connette, 154 La. 1081, 98 So. 674, the Louisiana Supreme Court deviated from the
cases involving co-ownership of land and, employing the doctrine of implied consent,
rendered judgment in favor of an operating co-lessee against a nonconsenting co-lessee
for the costs, including a charge by the operating co-lessee for supervision of both producing
wells and dry holes, even though the dry hole costs arguably were not incurred in connection
with the establishment of production, where the revenues previously.paid to the noncon-
senting co-lessee exceeded the amount of the judgment.
27. See, e.g., Freeman v. Depression Oil Co., 159 So. 192 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
28. Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Liles, 16 La. App. 500, 133 So. 835 (2d Cir.
1931).
29. 172 La. 913, 136 So. 1 (1931).
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acquired from a landowner who, at the time, owned one hundred percent
of the minerals, created a nonexclusive, as opposed to a co-owned,
mineral servitude. This servitude gave its owner the right to conduct
drilling operations without obtaining consent from the landowner. 30 Thus,
it is necessary to examine title to determine whether the owner of a
mineral servitude or lease covering a fractional interest in the minerals
can conduct operations without the consent of others.3'
2. The Mineral Code
a. The Right to Conduct Operations
The Mineral Code of 1974 codified some of the foregoing judicial
principles of co-ownership applicable to oil and gas exploration and
presumably left the remaining ones in place. As originally enacted, the
Mineral Code required unanimous consent of all owners for a co-owner
of mineral rights to conduct operations unless the co-owner was acting
to prevent waste. 32 In GMB Gas Corp. v. Cox, 33 the court applied the
Mineral Code requirement of unanimous consent to facts arising prior
to its enactment and enjoined a co-owner from conducting oil and gas
operations. Though the Mineral Code did not explicitly grant a co-
owner of land the right to act to prevent drainage or waste, most
commentators have concluded that this was an oversight and that the
co-owner of land does possess such a right.34 The Mineral Code preserved
30. See also Steele v. Denning, 456 So. 2d 992 (La. 1984); Cox v. Sanders, 421 So.
2d 869 (La. 1982); Starr Davis Oil Co. v. Webber, 218 La. 231, 48 So. 2d 906 (1950).
31. The concept of nonexclusive mineral servitudes creates an interesting theoretical
paradox: when a landowner who granted a nonexclusive mineral servitude sells the property
and reserves all or part of the minerals, does he thereby acquire a nonexclusive servitude?
Immediately prior to the sale, two persons had the right to explore and produce: the
landowner and the servitude owner. If the landowner's sale with a reservation of the
minerals is viewed as a reservation of what he already owns, then after the sale he also
has a nonexclusive mineral servitude. On the other hand, if the sale with a mineral
reservation is viewed as the vendee's grant of a mineral servitude, then the vendor does
not have a nonexclusive mineral servitude nor an independent right to explore for or
produce oil and gas. Since a landowner cannot create a mineral servitude on his property
in his own favor, the servitude reserved in an act of sale does not come into existence
until after title passes. Accordingly, the vendor in the foregoing hypothetical who reserved
the minerals would not acquire a nonexclusive servitude and would have no right to
operate without the consent of the owner of the nonexclusive servitude, who, ironically,
could operate without the former's consent.
32. A co-owner acting to prevent waste cannot intentionally interfere with another
co-owner's operations. Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 764 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1985).
33. 340 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
34. See, Hunter, supra note 2, at 143-44; John M. McCollam, A Primer for the
Practice of Mineral Law Under The New Louisiana Mineral Code, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 732,
848 n.760 (1976).
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the right of a co-owner of mineral rights to demand a partition" and,
the comments imply, a continued distinction between a co-owned mineral
right and a nonexclusive one.36
Effective January 1, 1987, Mineral Code articles 164 and 166 were
amended to permit one who acquires a mineral servitude or lease from
a co-owner of land to conduct operations if he has the consent of co-
owners owning at least an undivided ninety percent interest in the land.
3 7
Article 175 was also amended to permit a co-owner of a mineral servitude
to conduct operations so long as he has the consent of the co-owners
owning at least an undivided ninety percent interest in the servitude."
However, these amendments were short lived.
Act 647 of 1988, effective January 1, 1989, amended Mineral Code
articles 164 and 166 again, this time to permit the owner of a mineral
servitude or lease acquired from a co-owner of land to conduct operations
thereon if consent was obtained from those 'owning an undivided eighty
percent interest in the land, provided that every effort was made to
contact all owners and offer them the same contract.39 Mineral Code
article 175 was similarly amended to grant the same rights to the co-
owner of a mineral servitude. 40 However, no similar rights were granted
to a co-owner of a mineral lease who must still obtain the unanimous
consent of the remaining co-owners to conduct operations other than
to prevent waste, destruction or termination .4
Where the mineral right was derived from a co-owner, the mineral
right owner should have no greater rights to explore for or produce
minerals than the co-owner. 42 For example, where co-owners of the same
mineral servitude each execute a mineral lease in favor of a different
party, the relative operating rights between the resulting lessees will be
determined by the law of co-ownership of mineral servitudes, not by
35. La. R.S. 31:172 (1989).
36. Id. 31:169 & comment.
37. 1986 La. Acts No. 1047, § I (act approved July 17, 1986, amended 1988).
38. Id.
39. La. R.S. 31:166, 31:175 (1989). An argument can be made that Mineral Code
articles 164, 166 and 175 permit operations with less than eighty percent interest consenting.
These articles literally require only that the servitude owner or lessee has made every
effort to contact such co-owners, which, arguably, is a reference to "co-owners owning
at least an undivided eighty percent interest in the land." Reading the word "provided"
to mean "unless," the act then takes on an entirely different meaning: the co-owner of
a mineral servitude, or one who acquires a servitude or lease from a co-owner of land,
may exercise that right as long as he has made every effort to contact the owners of
eighty percent of the land or servitude and has offered to contract with them on sub-
stantially the same basis.
40. La. R.S. 31:175 (1989).
41. Id. 31:177.
42. See Hunter, supra note 2, at 138 n.6; but see Thomas A. Harrell, Problems
Created By Co-Ownership in Louisiana, 32nd Ann. Inst. on Min. L. 379, 426-27 (1985).
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the law of co-ownership of mineral leases. Each lessee can exercise his
lessor's right to veto operations and neither lessee can operate without
the other's consent unless one of them has met the requirements of
Mineral Code article 175. 43
Professor Harrell has suggested that where two co-owners of land
lease their lands to two different persons, each lessee is free to conduct
operations without anyone's consent. 44 He reaches this conclusion by
arguing that when the co-owner of land creates the lease he consents
to a general devotion of the land to mineral purposes. Furthermore,
the argument goes, neither lessee can object because the right to explore
for the minerals does not carry with it the right to prevent anyone else
from doing the same. This analysis is suspect for two reasons. First,
consent to one type of operation, or any activities by one party, does
not imply consent to all operations by any party. Second, inherent in
the right to explore for and produce minerals is the right to determine
the fashion in which the exploration and production takes place. Pro-
fessor Harrell is correct in stating that a co-owner of land who has
leased his interest has no right to object to the operations conducted
by a lessee of another co-owner; however, the lessee of the aforemen-
tioned co-owner, who has derivatively acquired the landowner's rights,
may veto the other lessee's operations in order to protect his right to
determine the fashion in which the property is developed.
b. The Right to Recover Costs
A co-owner of land or of a mineral right, acting to prevent waste,
may recover the costs of those operations out of production. 4 Although
the Mineral Code makes no provision for cost recovery by a co-owner
not acting to prevent waste, the courts nevertheless have held that a
nonparticipating co-owner cannot share in production until the operating
co-owner has recouped his expenses. 46 Indeed, the operating owner of
a mineral lease granted by a co-owner of land may retain one hundred
percent of the proceeds of the well while recouping expenses to the
prejudice of the other co-owner of the land.47
43. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40. Where the first lessee has an eighty
percent ownership interest under the lease and the other lessee has the remaining twenty
percent, it may be argued that the first lessee need make no effort to contact the other
lessee because it would be a vain and useless act.
44. Harrell, supra note 42, at 427-28.
45. La. R.S. 31:164 (land), 31:166 (land), 31:175 (servitude), 31:176 (servitude), 31:177
(lease) (1989).
46. Grace-Cajun Oil Co. No. 3 v. FDIC, 882 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1989); Willis v.
International Oil & Gas Corp., 541 So. 2d 332 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
47. Willis v. International Oil & Gas Corp., 541 So. 2d 332 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
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Mineral Code articles 164 and 166 provide that a co-owner of land
who does not consent to mineral operations will have no liability for
the costs of development except out of his share of production. Mineral
Code articles 175 and 177 contain a similar provision regarding mineral
servitudes and mineral leases. However, the converse should not be true;
mere consent to the activities of a co-owner should not be equivalent
to an agreement to participate in those activities and to bear a share
of their costs.u
The comments to Mineral Code article 177 suggest that, in spite of
the article's literal wording, a nonparticipating lease co-owner could be
liable for the costs of a well in advance of production where it made
a demand, although no effort was made to specify the kind of demand
that would result in liability. Undoubtedly, this is an effort to respond
to the inequity of allowing a lease co-owner to share in production
without taking risks. However, there is no logical reason why a demand
in and of itself should trigger liability for exploration and development
costs, because a person with a legal right to something should also have
the right to demand it. A better solution is to amend Mineral Code
article 177 to provide that a co-owner of a lease or a lessee of a co-
owner wishing to participate in the production from a well must pay
his pro rata share of the costs or suffer a risk charge.
4 9
III. UNITIZATION
A. The Right to Conduct Operations
The Commissioner of Conservation has statutory authority to require
"owners," defined as persons with the right to drill, produce and
appropriate production,50 to pool their interests in a drilling unit to
prevent waste or to avoid drilling unnecessary wells." The Comnhissioner
also has broad power to regulate oil and gas exploration and produc-
tion. 2 However, the unitization statutes do not explicitly grant any
greater rights to conduct operations than those granted by the Mineral
Code, which would deny the operator of the unit the right to conduct
operations on a unit tract unless he had a real right in it, such as
ownership, a servitude or a lease. Thus, the unit operator would the-
oretically have no right to drill a well on or under a unit tract without
the owner's consent.
48. Harrell, supra note 42, at 393.
49. See infra text at notes 65-72.
50. La. R.S. 30:3(8) (1989).
51. Id. 30:9(A)(1).
52. See id. 30:4, 30:9.
19921
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In the landmark case of Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co.," the
Louisiana Supreme Court, noting that the unitization statutes superseded
the concept of private ownership of the subsurface, held that the operator
had not committed trespass when the unit well unintentionally strayed
from vertical and traversed the invisible subsurface boundary onto the
plaintiff's property. The court rejected the plaintiff's demand for an
injunction ordering the operator to remove the well.14 In so ruling, the
court observed that the Commissioner has "the general authority to
establish whatever rules, regulations, and orders are necessary to prevent
[waste] and to enforce the conservation laws,"" and further, that
"[u]nitization ... creates rights and interests in a pool of hydrocarbons
beyond the traditional property lines [and] effectively amends ... private
property laws .... "516 In Exxon Corp. v. Thompson, 7 the court, relying
upon Nunez, affirmed the Commissioner's authority to abrogate the rule
of capture5" by requiring that production which occurs prior to the
formation of a unit, but after the commencement of proceedings to
create one, should be shared on the basis of the subsequently created
unit. It remains to be seen how far rights of private ownership will be
superseded by the conservation laws.
No statute or case law defines the obligations of the unit operator
to the other owners in the unit or the rights of the other owners in
the unit well. The other owners in the unit generally are considered to
have no control over the operator's conduct of operations, although it
has been suggested that the operator's freedom to act may be restricted
by a broad fiduciary duty. 9 However, upon application of a nonoper-
ating owner, the Commissioner of Conservation presumably could issue
orders regarding the operation of the unit well.
B. The Right to Recover Costs
1. Jurisprudence
The unitization statute formerly provided that the operator may
charge the other interested owners with the actual reasonable expendi-
53. 488 So. 2d 955 (La.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 925, 107 S. Ct. 391 (1986).
54. See also Raymond v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. La.
1988).
55. Nunez, 488 So. 2d at 961 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 963.
57. 564 So. 2d 387 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 568 So. 2d 1054 (1990).
58. The rule of capture provides that oil and gas, like wild animals, are not susceptible
of ownership until reduced to possession. See Pierce v. Goldking Properties, Inc., 396
So. 2d 528 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 400 So. 2d 904 (1981).
59. John M. McCollam, Legal Relations Among Parties to Compulsory Units, 15th
Ann. Inst. on Min. L. 69, 73 (1968).
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tures, including a charge for supervision, incurred in developing and
operating the unit.60 Each owner included in the unit was obligated for
a percentage share of the drilling costs equal to its percentage share of
production from the unit well. 61 While the statute was silent regarding
collection of these expenses, in Hunter Co. v. McHugh,6 the court held
that the operator could retain all proceeds from production until the
costs of drilling, completing and equipping the well had been recouped
in a manner similar to the right of a co-owner to obtain reimbursement
out of proceeds. However, this was not the only way an operator could
obtain reimbursement of costs from an owner in a unit.
In Superior Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,63 the court held
that where a lessee provoked unitization proceedings that resulted in a
conservation order including its lease within the unit for the well, the
lessee was liable to the drilling party for a pro rata share of the well
costs. The court rejected the contention that the operator could only
recover costs from production. This divergence from the law of co-
ownership rectified the inequity of permitting a nonparticipating lessee
to obtain a share of production from a well without taking any of the
risks associated with its drilling.
In Davis Oil Co. v. Steamboat Petroleum Corp.,6 the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that a lessee which did not provoke the unitization
proceeding but did propose a counterplan therein that resulted in its
acreage being included in a unit for a proposed well was not liable for
its share of the costs of the well. The court reasoned that to rule
otherwise would be tantamount to placing a nonoperating co-owner at
risk of losing his property to a wealthier operator simply because he
exercised his statutory right to propose a counterplan. The court dis-
tinguished Humble because there the well had already been drilled when
the nonoperator provoked the unitization proceedings.
The court's attempt to distinguish Humble is unpersuasive and seems
more an effort to reach a result than sound legal reasoning. The Davis
Oil court sanctioned the nonoperator's "defensive" effort to prevent
drainage that might possibly occur in the future by proposing a coun-
terplan without incurring any financial obligation. However, in Humble,
where drainage was actually occurring, the nonoperator owed a duty to
his lessor to seek unitization. By fulfilling this duty, he incurred a
60. 1940 La. Acts No. 157, § 9 (act approved July 12, 1940, repealed 1985).
61. See General Gas Corp. v. Continental Oil Co., 230 So. 2d 906 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1970) (parties who had paid more than their share of the costs were entitled to a
refund).
62. 202 La. 97, 11 So. 2d 495 (La. 1942).
63. 165 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 246 La. 842, 167 So. 2d 668
(1964).
64. 583 So. 2d 1139 (La. 1991).
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financial liability for his pro rata share of well costs. This distinction
between provoking the proceedings and proposing a counterplan is su-
perficial. The Davis Oil court avoided the critical question-whether the
exercise of a conservation right, regardless of the nonoperator's financial
wherewithal, carries with it the obligation to share costs. The better
ruling would have been that it does; an acceptable ruling, overruling
Humble, would be that it does not. Davis Oil accomplished neither.
2. The Risk Fee Statute
a. The Risk Fee
Even under Humble, a nonoperating owner who provoked unitization
still incurred only the risk of evaluating the productive life and prof-
itability of the well based upon information obtained after drilling, as
opposed to the risk inherent in drilling. To remedy this inequity, the
legislature enacted the "Risk Fee" Statute, effective January 1, 1985,
which applies in the absence of a contract between owners having tracts
in the unit. 65 The statute provides that an owner who has drilled a
unit well or intends to drill a unit well may require all the other lease
owners in the unit to pay their share of the costs or suffer a risk charge
by notifying them by certified mail of: (a) an estimate of the cost of
drilling, testing, completing and equipping the well; (b) the location of
the well; (c) the objective depth; and (d) all logs, core analyses, pro-
duction data and well test data from the unit well. 67 The election to
participate must be mailed within thirty days of receipt of the initial
notice; failure to reply timely constitutes an election not to participate."
The operator is obliged to commence the well within 90 days of the
nonoperator's receipt of the initial notice, or a new notice must be
sent. 69
65. La. R.S. 30:10(A)(2) (1989).
66. Presumably, the Mineral Code still governs when a co-owner of a drillsite has
the right to drill and, therefore, may be considered an "owner" under the Risk Fee
Statute. La. R.S. 30:3(8) (1989). A co-owner of land or the owner of a servitude or lease
derived therefrom, or a co-owner of a mineral servitude or the owner of a lease derived
therefrom, would have no right to drill, and thus could not be considered an "owner,"
unless those with an interest in the real right totalling eighty percent consented, or the
operation was necessary to prevent waste. See supra text accompanying notes 32-40.
The owner of the nonexclusive servitude or lease has the right to drill and produce
and would constitute an "owner." See supra text accompanying notes 29-30 and 36.
A co-owner of a mineral lease could not be considered an owner unless all co-owners
agreed upon the operation or one was acting to prevent waste. See supra text accompanying
note 41.
67. La. R.S. 30:10(A)(2)(a)(i) (1989).
68. Id. 30:10(A)(2)(a)(ii).
69. Id. 30:10(A)(2)(a)(iii).
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If a lease owner in the unit elects not to participate in the well, or
elects to participate and fails to pay his share of costs within sixty days
of receipt of a detailed invoice, then, in addition to any other legal
remedies, the owner drilling the well may recover the costs of drilling,
testing, completing, equipping and operating the unit well, including a
charge for supervision, plus a risk charge, out of production. 0 The
wording of the statute indicates that the invoice may only be for sums
already expended by the drilling owner, i.e., there can be no advance
billing for well costs. The risk charge is one hundred percent of the
cost of drilling, testing and completing the unit well allocable to the
tract belonging to the nonparticipating owner."' The cost of equipping
the well is not a part of the risk charge.72
b. Collection of Costs
Although any owner, including a landowner, servitude owner or
lessee, may propose a well under the statute, and thereby potentially
collect a risk charge, the risk charge may only be collected out of a
lessee's interest in the unit." The lessor's royalty and any overriding
royalty attributable to a nonparticipating lease must be paid while the
risk charge is being recouped. While the statute does not specify whether
the nonparticipating lessee or the drilling owner must pay the royalties,
an argument can be made that the drilling owner must pay them because
the statute states that the royalty owner shall receive that portion of
the "production," not proceeds, due them under the lease.
The Risk Fee Statute preserves the right, established in Hunter, of
a drilling owner to recoup costs out of production. 74 While the statute
preserves other available legal remedies to enforce collection, its wording
allows an argument that a drilling owner may now obtain a judgment
for costs against a nondrilling owner who provoked a unitization pro-
ceeding only after complying with the statutory notice requirements."
c. Recoverable Costs
The Commissioner has jurisdiction to determine unit well costs or
depreciated unit well costs, 76 but cannot allocate or enforce collection
70. Id. 30:10(A)(2)(b)(i).
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. See id. 30:10(A)(2)(e).
74. See id. 30:10(A)(2)(b)(ii).
75. Compare id. 30:10(A)(2)(b)(i) with id. 30:10(A)(2)(b)(ii).
76. La. R.S. 30:10(A)(2)(f) (1989). For an excellent discussion of depreciation, al-
location and the amount of unit well costs, see Robert T. Jorden, Unit Well Costs, 14th
Ann. Inst. on Min. L. 15 (1967).
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of those costs.77 Prior to the Risk Fee Statute, the Commissioner ruled
that where production occurs before unitization, the original well costs
are depreciated to the same extent that the unit reserves have been
depleted by production prior to unitization." The Risk Fee Statute, as
originally enacted, provided that the cost of drilling, testing, completing,
equipping, and operating the well should be reduced by the amount of
money received from the sale of production prior to the formation or
revision of the unit to include nonparticipating tracts9.7  Relying upon
that statute, the Commissioner of Conservation ruled that prior pro-
duction would reduce the costs allocable to the nonparticipating owners
only on a dollar for dollar basis, as opposed to a percentage depletion
basis.9
The question also arose as to whether this was the only way in
which the costs allocable to the nonparticipating owners would be re-
duced. If a well encountered several productive horizons and the deepest
were unitized, would the nonparticipating owners in the unit have to
bear the entire cost of the well, or would their share of costs be reduced
to take into account the fact that they would not participate in the up-
hole reserves? The Commissioner of Conservation ruled that the owners
of the first unitized pool were responsible for the entire cost of the
well.8 ' Savvy operators, in an effort to reduce their costs, may be
expected to structure their wells to reach at least one sand that can be
unitized with other owners in order to take advantage of this rule.
Act 595 of 1991, effective September 6, 1991, amended the Risk
Fee Statute to provide that the costs shall be reduced in the same
proportion as the recoverable reserves in the unitized pool have been
recovered by prior production. 2 A nonparticipating owner is no longer
entitled to a dollar for dollar reduction in costs based upon prior
production. Thus, even if the operator's well costs have been recovered
from prior production, he can compel a nonparticipating lease owner
to pay a portion of the costs or suffer a penalty."
The legislature probably did not intend for Act 595 to address the
problem of allocating the costs of the well to the owners of the various
77. Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co., 298 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused,
302 So. 2d 37 (La. 1974); Anisman v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 98 So. 2d 603 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1957). See also Superior Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 257 La. 207,
241 So. 2d 911 (1970).
78. La. Comm'r of Conservation Order No. 125A-l-a (1955). See Jorden, supra note
76, at 18.
79. La. R.S. 30:10(A)(2)(c), (d) (1989) (amended 1991).
80. La. Comm'r of Conservation Order No. 860-1 (1990).
81. La. Comm'r of Conservation Order No. 860-1 Supplement (1990).
82. 1991 La. Acts No. 595, § 1.
83. See id.
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pools encountered by the well. However, the act's literal language seems
to address the problem by allowing the operator to recover well costs
each time a new horizon in the well is unitized to include owners who
have not previously contributed to the costs of the well.Y A fairer
solution would be to allocate costs based upon the relationship between
the reserves in the unitized pool and all recoverable reserves in the well.
Another unsettled issue concerns the sale of production related equip-
ment and facilities after production ceases. Traditional concepts of prop-
erty law suggest that ownership of the land or mineral rights would
carry with it ownership of any movable property that becomes incor-
porated therein, such as tubing in a wellbore, or property dedicated to
the production of oil and gas, such as production facilities. Thus, when
production ceased, the owner drilling the well would have the right to
sell the tubing and facilities for his exclusive benefit. On the other hand,
it seems only fair that the proceeds of such a sale be distributed pro-
portionately to all owners in the unit who paid for the well. Arguably,
such an equitable result could be achieved through the Commissioner
of Conservation's authority to determine depreciated well costs.8 5
d. Unanswered Questions
There are a number of unanswered questions raised by the Risk Fee
Statute. The statute states that the owner drilling the well may recover
the costs and the risk charge out of production. However, are the other
owners who elected to participate in the well entitled to share in the
risk charge? It would seem equitable to permit all parties sharing in
the costs of the well to also share in any risk charge.8 6 Similarly, does
failure to timely pay one invoice, representing a portion of the costs,
result in liability for the entire risk charge even where some payments
were made? Again, it would seem equitable to calculate the risk charge
only upon the unpaid portion of the costs. In addition, will a dispute
over the reasonableness of the drilling owner's expenditures toll the sixty-
day period in which payment is due? Here, it seems inequitable to
subject a participating party to the risk charge because he refused to
pay an unreasonable invoice within sixty days. On the other hand, it
seems inequitable to permit a participating party to delay paying a
84. Such a result conflicts with the principle, enunciated in Desormeaux v. Inexco
Oil Co., 298 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 302 So. 2d 37 (1974), that
the operator may not recover its costs twice.
85. See La. R.S. 30:10(A)(2)(f) (1989).
86. But see General Gas Corp. v. Continental Oil Co., 230 So. 2d 906 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1970) (mere ownership in unit does not entitle owner to participate in operator's
recoupment of drilling costs).
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reasonable invoice by invoking procedures to test its reasonableness.1 7
Yet another question arises-must all lease co-owners participate in
the well in order to avoid the risk charge? The statute does not specify
whether each co-owner of a mineral lease has an independent right to
participate, nor whether the risk charge will be reduced to the nonpar-
ticipating co-owners' percentage interest in the tract. The statute literally
provides that the owner drilling the well may recover, out of production
allocable to the tract belonging to the nonparticipating owner, a risk
charge, defined as one hundred percent of such tract's allocated share
of the cost of drilling, testing, and completing the unit well."8 The fact
that the risk charge was defined as the tract's allocated share of costs,
instead of the owner's allocated share of costs, indicates that the risk
charge was intended to be imposed on a tract by tract, as opposed to
a lessee by lessee, basis.8 9 On the other hand, an argument can be made
that a lessee of a tract who has no independent right to drill (either a
lease co-owner or a lessee of less than eighty percent of the minerals)
has the right to elect to participate in a well because incurring the risk
charge constitutes wasteP ° Under these circumstances, the lessee would
have to put up all costs allocable to the entire tract but could recover
only costs, 9' unless, by such an election, that lessee could be considered
a drilling owner with the right to obtain a risk fee. 92 These questions
are but a few that might give rise to future litigation.
C. Sharing Production/Gas Balancing
Each owner of a tract in a unit owns a proportionate share of
production from the unit well. 93 The operator is obligated to account
87. Cf. J-O'B Operating Co. v. Newmont Oil Co., 560 So. 2d 852 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 565 So. 2d 449 (1990) (party electing to participate in area of mutual
interest acquisition not allowed to contest consideration paid by the acquirer).
88. La. R.S. 30:10(A)(2)(b)(i) (1989).
89. Furthermore, a mineral operation conducted on a unitized tract is fictitiously
considered to take place on each tract in the unit and so, theoretically, a lessee of a
fractional interest in a non-drillsite tract would not have the right to conduct such fictitious
operations without the consent of the other lessees.
90. See La. R.S. 31:177 (1989).
91. Allowing a participating lessee of a non-drillsite tract to participate in the risk
fee paid by his co-lessee might violate the principles of the Mineral Code that limit
recovery to actual costs or expenses. See id. & comment.
92. Such an interpretation would create a conflict between the Risk Fee Statute and
the notion that a lease co-owner acting to prevent waste must secure the same benefits
for his co-owner that he secures for himself. See id.
93. See La. R.S. 30:10(A)(l)(b) (1989); State ex rel. Superior Oil Co. v. Texas Gas
Transmission Corp., 242 La. 315, 136 So. 2d 55 (1961).
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for the production to other owners in the unit.Y If the unit operator
sells oil or gas, then he must share the proceeds with any unleased
owner in the unit who has not made arrangements to separately dispose
of his share of production." Different rights are accorded to a leasehold
owner and to unleased owners who have made arrangements to separately
dispose of their share of production.
While oil may be stored in tanks, which facilitates an in-kind division
between co-owners, gas, on the other hand, is ordinarily insusceptible
of storage, raising unique partition problems. In Amoco Production Co.
v. Thompson,9 the court held that the creation of a Commissioner's
unit effectively partitioned the ownership of the gas. The court observed
that a marketing owner had the theoretical right, if necessary, to sell
one hundred percent of the gas produced from the well at any given
time, in effect leaving the other owners' share of gas in the ground
subject to their right to make up in kind or in cash by applying to the
Commissioner for an appropriate order at a later date. However, the
court also held that, upon proof that an in-kind partition would result
in waste, adversely affect another co-owner's right to recover its pro
rata share of production, or adversely affect the correlative rights of
the co-owners, the Commissioner had the authority in appropriate cir-
cumstances to alter this in-kind partition and order the operator to
market gas for the other owners, or balance by cash payments.Y On
appeal after remand, the court affirmed the Commissioner's order that
the marketing owners balance takes by payments in cash for the period
that the nonmarketing owners were effectively without a market on the
ground that such an order was necessary to protect their correlative
rights."
IV. OPERATING AGREEMENTS
A. Introduction
An agreement to share the risk and expense of oil and gas exploration
and production is referred to as a "joint operating agreement," or,
simply, an "operating agreement." The property covered by such an
94. Dixon v. American Liberty Oil Co., 226 La. 911, 77 So. 2d 533 (1954); see W.
Perry Pearce, Legal Relations Among Parties to a Unit, 34th Ann. Inst. on Min. L. 107
(1987).
95. La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3) (1989). See Taylor v. Woodpecker Corp., 562 So. 2d 888
(La. 1990).
96. 516 So. 2d 376 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1987), writ denied, 520 So. 2d 118 (1988).
97. Id. at 394-95.
98. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 566 So. 2d 138 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied,
571 So. 2d 627 (1990).
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agreement is referred to as the "contract area." Operating agreements
typically designate one party, known as the "operator," to conduct the
day to day operations and then charge the other parties, known as
nonoperators, for their share of the operating costs. An operating agree-
ment differs from a passive investment, such as a limited partnership,
because the nonoperators have rights to influence the operations." Op-
erating agreements usually address in some fashion one or both of the
following questions: (1) what property rights are affected by the agree-
ment? and (2) what are the parties' rights and obligations with respect
to the conduct of, and accounting for, drilling and production opera-
tions?
Most cases dealing with operating disputes are decided based upon
the specific language of the agreement or the absence of any provision
in the agreement. The language of the agreement is often more important
than prior court decisions. Nevertheless, prior cases are indicative of
how agreements will be interpreted, as well as judicial inclinations.
Considering the dearth of Louisiana cases, common law authorities are
often useful in determining how a court will interpret the agreement,
and for discerning the custom of the industry.
B. Relationship of the Parties
The characterization of the relationship between parties to an op-
erating agreement often becomes the focus in determining the parties'
rights and liabilities,1°° particularly when no provision of the agreement
governs the matter in dispute. The concepts of joint venture, partnership
and mandate, or agency, have been proffered as the proper character-
ization of the legal relationship normally created by joint oil and gas
operating agreements. 0' The parties' rights and obligations, where not
specified in the agreement, should be determined by equity, custom in
the industry, and selective analogy to the law of co-ownership, part-
nership, and mandate.' 2
99. See Stewart v. Ragland, 934 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
100. See Sabine Supply Co. v. Cameron Oil Co., 175 La. 360, 143 So. 327 (1932).
101. See Howard L. Boigon, The Joint Operating Agreement in a Hostile Environment,
38 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 5-1, 5-4 to 5-6 (1987); Christopher Lane & Catherine
J. Boggs, Duties of Operator or Manager to Its Joint Venturers, 29 Rocky Mtn. Min.
L. Inst. 199, 201-09 (1983); Ernest E. Smith, Duties and Obligations Owed by an Operator
to Nonoperators, Investors, and Other Interest Owners, 32 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 12-
1, 12-5 to 12-12 (1986).
102. See La. Civ. Code art. 3; id. art. 2053; Davis Oil Co. v. Steamboat Petroleum
Corp., 583 So. 2d 1139 (La. 1991); Sabine, 175 La. 360, 143 So. 327; McCollam, supra
note 59, at 75.
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1. Joint Venture
Parties to an operating agreement often refer to co-participants as
their partners even though partnership duties,'0 3 such as the fiduciary
duty, may be inconsistent with their understanding of the agreement.
A partnership or joint venture is an agreement between two or more
persons to combine their property or labor for joint profit through joint
control,1°4 and is governed by the same rules as a partnership even when
the parties may not have so intended. 05 A joint venture or partnership
may be formed by an oral agreement or inferred from the conduct of
the parties or other circumstances, '0 and its existence is a question of
fact. 0° No satisfactory distinction between partnership and joint venture
has been developed,1es and one is probably unnecessary since the same
103. The relationship of partnership or joint venture carries with it the following rights
and liabilities:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, decisions affecting management must be made by
majority vote, each partner having one vote, except that unanimity is required
to amend the partnership agreement, admit new partners, terminate the rela-
tionship or permit a partner to withdraw without cause prior to the expiration
of the term. La. Civ. Code art. 2807;
(2) A partner owes a fiduciary duty to the partnership. Id. art. 2809;
(3) A partner has the right to inform himself of the partnership's business and
inspect its records. Id. art. 2813;
(4) Each partner has the right to bind the partnership in the ordinary course
of business, other than in the alienation, lease or encumbrance of immovable
property. Id. art. 2814;
(5) The partnership. is principally liable for its debts, each partner is secondarily
liable for his virile share of the debts; a provision that a partner is not so
liable has no effect on third parties. Id. arts. 2817, 2815;
(6) A partnership may expel a partner for just cause. Unless otherwise provided
in the partnership agreement, the expulsion must be by majority vote. Id. art.
2820;
(7) A partner may withdraw at any time not unfavorable to the partnership
unless it has been constituted for a term, in which case the withdrawal must
be based upon just cause arising out of the failure of another partner to perform
an obligation. Id. arts. 2822, 2821; and
(8) The partnership is a separate entity which may own assets, except that
immovable property is owned by the partners unless the agreement is in writing.
Id. art. 2806; W. & W. Oil Co. v. American Supply Co., 8 So. 2d 384 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1942).
104., See Riddle v. Simmons, 589 So. 2d 89, 92 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991), writ refused,
592 So. 2d 1316 (1992); Esta v. Persohn, 44 So. 2d 202 (La. App. Orl. 1950).
105. La. Civ. Code art. 2801; Grand Isle Campsites, Inc. v. Cheek, 262 La. 5, 262
So. 2d 350 (1972).
106. Riddle, 589 So. 2d at 92.
107. Prentice v. Amax Petroleum Corp., 187 So. 2d 752 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
refused, 249 La. 617, 188 So. 2d 607 (1966).
108. See Blake West, Comment, The Business Joint Venture in Louisiana, 25 Tul. L.
Rev. 382, 383 (1951).
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rules govern both. It has, nevertheless, been suggested that a joint venture
relates to a single enterprise, whereas a partnership relates to general
business of a particular kind.' 9
Many operating agreements negate the existence of a partnership.
Louisiana courts have held that a provision in an operating agreement
negating the existence of a partnership will be given effect." 0 Further-
more, in 1980, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Mineral Code article
215, effective January 1, 1981, which provides that a written operating
agreement will not create a partnership unless it expressly so provides."'
Where the agreement is not written, or came into existence prior to
1981, the parties thereto may be joint venturers governed by the law
of partnership. However, even if there is no partnership, a fiduciary
duty may still exist if the relationship can be characterized as one of
mandate."2
2. Mandate
The concept of mandate, or agency, has been used to impose liability
upon nonoperators for obligations to third parties incurred by the op-
erator."3 A mandate is an act by which one person gives another the
power to transact for him and in his name one or several affairs and
may be for the joint interest of both parties.' "4 This relationship may
be created either expressly or by implication." 5
The essential element of the relationship is that the principal has
the right to control the conduct of the agent." 6 This element may be
lacking in some areas, such as nonconsent operations, where the operator
may pursue its own self interest even though that interest is opposite
the interests of a nonoperator. However, this right to control may be
present in other areas, such as the handling of lawsuits, where, depending
upon the terms of the agreement, the nonoperator may have effective
control over the operator's conduct.
109. Id. at 386; Riddle, 589 So. 2d at 92.
110. See Sabine Supply Co. v. Cameron Oil Co., 175 La. 360, 143 So. 327 (1932);
Prentice v. Amax Petroleum Corp., 220 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 254
La. 455, 223 So. 2d 867 (1969).
Ill. La. R.S. 31:215 (1989).
112. See Britton v. Green, 325 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1963); cf. McCollam, supra note
59, at 71-81 (rules of mandate may apply to unit operator).
113. See infra text accompanying note 206.
114. La. Civ. Code arts. 2985, 2986.
115. Craft v. Trahan, 351 So. 2d 277 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), writ refused, 353 So.
2d 1336 (1978).
116. Id. at 281.
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3. The Fiduciary Duty
A partner or a mandatary owes a fiduciary duty to the principal." 7
The fiduciary duty establishes a standard of conduct that has been
summarized as follows:
[The fiduciary relationship] imposes upon [fiduciaries] the ob-
ligation of the utmost good faith and fairness in their dealings
with one another with respect to partnership affairs. Each partner
must refrain from taking any advantage of another partner by
the slightest misrepresentation or concealment of material facts.
The obligation is especially stringent on a partner who is man-
aging the business, his duty being analogous to that of a trustee."8
As may be inferred from the foregoing, the fiduciary duty carries with
it an obligation to disclose material information and to refrain from
acquiring any secret advantage or profit in connection with the enter-
prise."19
However, many customs of the oil and gas industry conflict with
the requirements of a fiduciary duty. For example, the custom of the
oil and gas industry treats certain information, particularly geological
interpretations, as proprietary and not to be shared, even with co-
participants. 120 In Louisiana, the fiduciary duty may be eliminated by
provisions that reflect the parties' intent to preclude such a relationship
of trust, such as a provision that negates the existence of a partnership 2'
or one that contains contractual provisions contrary to such a duty. 2
Even the common law courts that have been willing to find the existence
of a joint venture, or mining partnership, in spite of such provisions,2
have generally imposed a fiduciary duty only in nonoperational spheres
117. Noe v. Roussel, 310 So. 2d 806 (La. 1975). Indeed, partnership is a type of
mandate. Cf. La. Civ. Code art. 2814 (partner is mandatary for partnership).
118. W.A. McMichael Constr. Co. v. D & W Properties, Inc., 356 So. 2d 1115, 1122
(La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 359 So. 2d 198 (1978).
119. Grand Isle Campsites, Inc. v. Cheek, 262 La. 5, 262 So. 2d 350 (1972); Prentice
v. Amax Petroleum Corp., 187 So. 2d 752 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 249 La.
617, 188 So. 2d 607 (1966).
120. See Tenneco Oil Co. v. Bogert, 630 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (held that
under Oklahoma law no fiduciary duty exists to share information regarding production
outside of contract area).
121. Prentice v. Amax Petroleum Corp., 220 So.2d 783 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 254 La. 455, 223 So. 2d 867 (1969).
122. Caddo Oil Co., Inc. v. O'Brien, 908 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1990) (no fiduciary duty
to provide accounting of expenditures).
123. E.g., Great W. Oil & Gas Co. v. Mitchell, 326 P.2d 794 (Okla. 1958); Stephens
v. Allen, 237 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Ky. App. 1951).
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such as marketing production ' 21 or accounting for production revenues.1'1
In the absence of a statutory or contractual negation, some kind of
trust relationship may be appropriate in nonoperational spheres since
the nonoperator has literally entrusted his own property or money to
the operator, not just property in which they both have an interest.
Some commentators and common law courts have focused upon the
sophistication of the participants in deciding whether to impose a fi-
duciary duty upon the operator.'1 s This type of factual inquiry may
seem equitable but should be rejected because it causes far too much
uncertainty regarding the operator's duties. In any event, the parties to
an operating agreement are required to perform the obligations in good
faith. 2 7
4. Third Parties
In the absence of a stipulation pour autri, the rights and obligations
created by an operating agreement should extend only to the parties
thereto. However, in Huggs, Inc. v. LPC Energy, Inc.,128 the court held
that an operator, who acquired its interest in a mineral lease subject
to an overriding royalty, was liable in damages to the owner of the
overriding royalty even though the latter was .not a party to the operating
agreement. The court rejected the operator's lack of privity argument
and, employing a tort analysis, held that the operator's duty under the
operating agreement to maintain the lease extended to the overriding
royalty owner because such owner was at risk should the lease be
negligently lost. The court's reasoning is flawed, however, because,
without agreement, the operator had no duty to maintain the lease, and
the operator agreed only to protect the nonoperators' interest, not that
of third parties. 1' 9 The notion that the duties imposed in an operating
agreement can extend to nonparties is a considerable expansion of the
law that could create numerous unforeseen liabilities. Therefore, Huggs
should be overruled or limited to its facts.
124. See Howell v. Bach, 580 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. App. 1978); but see Gerard J. W.
Bos & Co.. Inc. v. Harkins & Co., 883 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1989).
125. See Reserve Oil, Inc. v. Dixon, 711 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1983); but see In re
Wilson, 69 B.R. 960 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
126. See Smith, supra note 101, at 12-1; Dime Box Petroleum Corp. v. Louisiana
Land & Exploration Co., 717 F. Supp. 717 (D. Colo. 1989).
127. La. Civ. Code art. 1983.
128. 889 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1989).
129. See Avatar Exploration, Inc. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 933 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.
1991) (overriding royalty owners have no standing to seek damages for breach of agreement).
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C. The Effect on Title
1. Writing Requirement
The parol evidence rule conclusively prohibits proof of ownership
of immovable property by testimony,3 0 except where the vendor admits
the sale under oath at trial and the item has been delivered.'"' Therefore,
an operating agreement must be in writing to affect title to a real right
such as land, a mineral servitude, or a mineral lease. 3 2 The writing
must clearly declare the parties' intent to be bound and the basic terms
of the agreement,' but the writing need not be in a particular form.1
3
'
For example, in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Martin Exploration Co.,'" the
court held that an exchange of telexes constituted a writing sufficient
to establish a lease forfeiture penalty for failure to participate in op-
erations.
What constitutes an effect upon title to a real right is not always
readily apparent. In Hayes v. Muller,"' the court rejected the plaintiff's
claim that it was entitled to a share of the consideration defendant
received for the sale of a mineral lease. The plaintiff argued that parol
evidence was admissible to establish that the lease was owned by a joint
venture between plaintiff and defendant with title nominally held in
defendant's name. The court rejected the argument that the claim was
for an accounting and had no affect on title on the grounds that the
claim necessarily depended upon oral proof that the mineral lease was
owned by the joint venture.' 7
130. Little v. Haik, 246 La. 121, 163 So. 2d 558 (1964).
131. See La. Civ. Code art. 1839 (verbal sale); Larido v. Perkins, 132 La. 660, 61
So. 728 (1913).
132. La. R.S. 31:16, 31:18 (1989); see Hayes v. Muller, 245 La. 356, 158 So. 2d 191
(1963).
133. See Chauvin v. Bohn, 411 So. 2d 442 (La. 1982); Jackson v. Dominick, 166 So.
867 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936).
134. Cf. Crescent Drilling & Dev., Inc. v. Sealexco, Inc., 570 So. 2d 151 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1990) (title proved not by assignment but by written extrinsic evidence and parol
evidence), writ denied, 575 So. 2d 373 (1991).
135. 447 So. 2d 469 (La. 1984).
136. 245 La. 356, 158 So. 2d 191 (1963).
137. - In Grand Isle Campsites, Inc. v. Cheek, 262 La. 5, 262 So. 2d 350 (1972), the
court relied upon parol evidence to establish the existence of a joint venture between
plaintiff and defendant to acquire real estate, holding the defendant liable in the amount
of a secret profit made on a sale to the joint venture for breach of his fiduciary duty.
Hayes and Cheek are distinguishable because in Cheek the award was based upon a
breach of fiduciary duty while in Hayes the relief sought depended upon ownership of
the property in question. Presumably, if the defendant in Cheek had sold the property
to a third party, instead of the joint venture, he would have incurred no liability.
Additionally, parol evidence is admissible to prove a joint venture to share profits from
co-owned immovable property. Riddle v. Simmons, 589 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1991), writ refused, 592 So. 2d 1316 (1992).
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2. Public Records
All contracts affecting a mineral right must be recorded in the public
records to have effect on third parties.1 31 The mere reference to an
operating agreement in a 'recorded instrument does not have any effect
on third parties. 3 9 Assignees and mortgagees of a party to an unrecorded
operating agreement will not themselves be bound by it absent express
agreement.' 4° However, a party who acquires a mineral lease by an
assignment which provides that it is made subject to an unrecorded
operating agreement will be bound by the referenced agreement. 14' In
Transworld Drilling Co. v. Texas General Petroleum Co.,142 the court
held that whether an assignee assumes the assignor's liabilities under an
operating agreement when the assignee takes an assignment subject to
the operating agreement is a question of fact depending upon the parties'
intent. 43 Furthermore, a mortgagee who obtains a pledge of production
proceeds subject to an unrecorded agreement is liable for the mortgagor's
share of the well costs to the extent of the revenue received by the
mortgagee. '"
Parties to operating agreements are reluctant to record them because
recordation often reveals their plans to explore for and produce oil and
gas, as well as their rights and obligations. In Louisiana, a declaration
in lieu of the agreement may be filed in the public records in order to
put third parties on notice of the existence of an agreement. , Such a
declaration must: (a) be signed by a party designated as operator or
agent; (b) contain a description of the property covered by the agreement;
(c) state the general nature or import of the agreement; and (d) designate
the location where a complete copy of the agreement may be found.
However, such a declaration may give the public the right to review
the operating agreement, and no court has decided to what extent the
declaration binds third parties insofar as provisions not referred to in
the declaration are contained in the operating agreement.
3. The Term
An operating agreement must have a certain and definite term, or
it will be terminable at will unless a term may be implied commensurate
138. La. R.S. 9:2731 (1991).
139. See Sklar Producing Co. v. Rushing, 262 So. 2d 115 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 262 La. 310, 263 So. 2d 47 (1972).
140. See Grace-Cajun Oil Co. No. 3 v. FDIC, 882 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1989).
141. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Adams, 209 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
252 La. 473, 211 So. 2d 333 (1968).
142. 524 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
143. But see Grace-Cajun Oil Co. No. 3 v. FDIC, 882 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1989) (one
who acquires "subject to" incurs no personal liability).
144. Id.
145. La. R.S. 9:2732 (1991).
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with the nature of the contemplated operations.'4 However, an operating
agreement will only preclude a partition between co-owners if the parties
specifically agree to a term in writing. 4 Further, to the extent that title
to real property is affected, any agreement regarding the term must be
in writing to be binding upon the parties and recorded to be binding
upon third parties.
What constitutes a certain and definite term is a question of degree.
In Giardina v. Giardina,'41 the court held that an agreement not to
partition property until there was a favorable real estate market when
a fair and reasonable price could be obtained was too uncertain and
indefinite to be enforceable. On the other hand, in Eads Operating Co.,
Inc. v. Thompson, 49 the court held that a provision stating that the
operating agreement would remain in effect as long as oil or gas is, or
can be, produced in paying quantities from a certain geological for-
mation, or sand, necessitated a factual hearing regarding the productive
capacity of the formation, despite evidence that there had been no
production for over two years and that the mineral leases had been
abandoned. While defining the term to be as long as production is
actually obtained in paying quantities is satisfactory,'10 a term based
upon the productive capability of a sand seems uncertain and indefinite
given the imprecise nature of geology and reservoir engineering.
4. Share of Production
The execution of an agreement containing cost and profit sharing
provisions does not ordinarily constitute an assignment of real rights.", m
Nonetheless, in Crow Drilling & Producing Co. v. Hunt, " the parties
executed a letter agreement specifying their respective shares of the costs
and revenues of wells on the same day that an operating agreement was
executed. The court held that, in view of the separate letter agreement,
the failure of one party's title to mineral leases did not diminish his
share of production even though the operating agreement provided for
reducing his interest in the event of title loss.
A number of cases have held that an agreement between lease owners
fixing the distribution of production from wells is not altered or ab-
146. See La. Civ. Code art. 2054.
147. See Delta Drilling Co. v. Oil Fin. Corp., 195 La. 407, 196 So. 914 (1940).
148. 181 La. 42, 158 So. 615 (1935).
149. 537 So. 2d 1187, 1194 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988), writ denied, 538 So. 2d 614
(1989).
150. See Producers Oil Co. v. Gore, 610 P.2d 772 (Okla. 1980) (term equal to life
of mineral lease not violative of rule against perpetuities).
151. See Perry Pearce, The Legal Relationships Among Parties to a Unit, 34th Ann.
Inst. on Min. L. 107, 114 (1987).
152. 254 La. 662, 226 So. 2d 487 (1969).
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rogated by the creation of a commissioner's unit. " , However, in Kaiser
Aluminum Exploration Co. v. Celeron Oil & Gas Co.,"" the court held
that whether an agreement fixing the parties' share of costs and revenues
was altered by a commissioner's unit raised a question of fact regarding
the parties' intent.
5. Gas Balancing
As previously discussed, a party who has taken less than its share
of gas may make up the difference, or balance, by taking more than
its share of gas until its takes have become ratable with the other
party.' Where this in-kind method of balancing will not permit the
underproduced party to recover his just or equitable share, then that
party may make up by cash balancing, i.e., requiring the overproduced
party to pay him for his share of the gas that he did not receive." 56 In
Pogo Producing Co. v. Shell Offshore, Inc.,'" the court rejected a claim
for cash balancing where the operating agreement did not provide for
balancing and the well had not depleted. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Belco Petroleum Corp.,"' the court rejected Chevron's claim for cash
balancing after the well had depleted because the balancing agreement,
which Chevron proposed, provided only for in kind balancing. At a
minimum, Belco establishes that where the parties have agreed there will
be no cash balancing, that agreement will be given effect even if it
deprives a party of its pro rata share of the gas. However, a fair
interpretation of Belco is that a failure to mention cash balancing in a
balancing agreement will preclude that remedy even if the well depletes.
6. Acquisitions of Additional Acreage
In the absence of a fiduciary duty, the parties are free to acquire
acreage without disclosing the acquisition to, or sharing it with, the
other parties to the agreement.1" 9 Area of mutual interest and acreage
153. Id.; see Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 234 La. 939, 102
So. 2d 223 (1958); Southwest Gas Producing Co. v. Creslenn Oil Co., 181 So. 2d 63
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1965), writ denied, 248 La. 797, 182 So. 2d 74 (1966).
154. 526 So. 2d 374 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 278 (1988).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98. Pogo Prod. Co. v. Shell Offshore,
Inc., 898 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1990). For a thorough discussion of gas balancing see
Patrick Martin, The Gas Balancing Agreement: What, When, Why and How, 36 Rocky
Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 13-1 (1990).
156. See Pogo, 898 F.2d 1064..
157. Id.
158. 755 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847, 106 S. Ct. 140 (1985).
159. Compare Prentice v. Amax Petroleum Corp., 220 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 254 La. 455, 223 So. 2d 867 (1969) with Palmer v. Fuqua, 641 F.2d 1146
(5th Cir. 1981); Kaye v. Smitherman, 225 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1955).
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or cash contribution provisions are often used to ensure that the parties
share in acquisitions related to the contract area where there is no
fiduciary duty.
An area of mutual interest provision provides that any party who
acquires a mineral interest in a certain area must offer it to the other
parties on a pro rata basis. 6° An acreage or cash contribution clause
provides that a party receiving a contribution of cash, or acreage lying
outside of the contract area, toward the drilling of a well on the contract
area must share it with the other parties.' 6' The area of mutual interest
clause serves to maintain the parties' participation percentages in an
area; the acreage contribution clause serves to maintain those percentages
with respect to individual wells.
a. Area of Mutual Interest
The area of mutual interest provision typically covers any acquisition
of mineral rights, whether by purchase, farmout,' 62 or contribution. So
long as the acreage falls within the area of mutual interest, it must be
offered to the other parties. Litigation over these provisions has focused
on how the nonacquiring party elects to participate in the acquisition.
In Lyle Cashon Co. v. McKendrick,'13 the court held that while the
defendant had not explicitly exercised his option to participate in the
plaintiffs' acquisition of a lease in an area of mutual interest, his intent
to exercise that option was evidenced by the parties' actions. The court
further noted that the plaintiff was estopped to deny defendant's interest
because plaintiff had accepted the benefits of defendant's activities in
furtherance of the development of the acreage. However, in J-O'B
Operating Co. v. Newmont Oil Co.,'" the court held that the plaintiff
had not properly exercised its option to participate in the acquisition
because, although it notified defendant of its intent to participate, it
refused to pay certain costs which it contended were not necessary for
the acquisition. The court concluded that the area of mutual interest
provision did not allow the electing party to contest the necessity for,
or the extent of, any consideration paid by the acquirer for the interest.
160. See J-O'B Operating Co. v. Newmont Oil Co., 560 So. 2d 852 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 565 So. 2d 449 (1990).
161. See Superior Oil Co. v. Cox, 307 So. 2d 350 (La. 1975).
162. A farmout is an agreement to assign a mineral interest, usually a lease, conditioned
upon the drilling of a well. Robinson v. North Am. Royalties, 509 So. 2d 679 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1987).
163. 204 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1953).
164. J-O'B, 560 So. 2d 852.
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b. Acreage Contribution
Historically, a contribution was regarded as a conveyance of cash
or mineral rights by one party to another party to induce the latter to
drill a well. It has been suggested, however, that the word "contribution"
refers to the fact that the acreage will be included in, and, therefore,
"contribute" to, a unit for the well in question. In Superior Oil Co.
v. Cox, 16s the operator acquired a farmout of acreage outside the contract
area from another party to the operating agreement. The farmout agree-
ment provided that if the operator drilled a well, he would receive an
assignment of that portion of the farmout acreage included in a unit
for the well. The plaintiff, also a party to the operating agreement,
claimed that since the earning well was located on the contract area,
and the farmout acreage was subsequently included in the unit for said
well, the contribution clause obligated the operator to offer the farmout
acreage to plaintiff because it "contributed to" the well. The Louisiana
Supreme Court rejected this claim, stating that the acreage earned under
the farmout agreement was not a contribution because it was not earned
solely by the drilling of a well; the acreage earned also depended upon
the Commissioner of Conservation's subsequent determination that the
acreage should be included in the unit. The court also explained that
the contribution clause only applied to acreage obtained from persons
who were not parties to the operating agreement. Interestingly, in Harper
Oil Co. v. Yates Petroleum Corp.,' s the New Mexico Supreme Court
relied upon Superior to hold that the acreage contribution clause did
not apply to assignments or contributions between parties to the operating
agreement. The Harper court held that a nonoperator's farmout to the
operator in order to avoid a nonconsent penalty did not constitute an
acreage contribution.
7. Preferential Rights to Purchase
A preferential right to purchase mineral leases obligates a party
desiring to sell to offer an assignment of the lease to the other parti-
cipants prior to assigning or releasing it.167 These rights must be promptly
asserted, or they will be waived. In Marken v. Goodall,16' the court
held that the plaintiff waived his right to enforce a preferential right
to purchase by failing to assert it timely while the defendants engaged
165. 307 So. 2d 350 (La. 1975).
166. 733 P.2d 1313 (1987).
167. It should be noted, however, that a party who assigns a lease pursuant to a
preferential purchase obligation in an operating agreement will not be released of liability
to the lessor. La. R.S. 31:129 (1989).
168. 478 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1973).
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in costly operations. In contrast, however, the court in Mobil Exploration
& Producing North America, Inc. v. Graham Royalty, Ltd.,169 applied
Arkansas law to hold that the plaintiff had not unduly delayed exercising
its preferential right even though it was not asserted within the con-
tractual time period, because defendant had not given proper notice and
could not establish any detrimental reliance.
D. Operational Rights and Liabilities
1. Removal of the Operator
No Louisiana cases address under what circumstances an operator
may be removed. The notion that the operator may be terminated by
majority vote 0 gives insufficient weight to the parties' prior agreement
appointing the operator. Absent a contrary agreement, the operator
should have the same right to maintain his office as a mandatary with
an interest in the subject property of the mandate, i.e., the operator
should be removable only for cause.'' Likewise, the operator should
be able to resign at any time so long as the nonoperators are not
prejudiced by the timing of the resignation.'
2. Lease Maintenance
Absent a contrary agreement, each party is responsible for the
payment of rentals and royalties necessary for the maintenance of its
own mineral rights.'7 The operator may be liable to the nonoperator
where mineral rights are lost as a result of the operator's failure to
exercise due care in maintaining production or operations. 74 However,
an operator will not be liable for loss of mineral rights where the
nonoperator's failure to pay its share of the costs prevents the operator
169. 910 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1990).
170. Cf. La. Civ. Code art. 2807 (decisions affecting partnership made by majority
vote).
171. See Robinson v. Hunt, 211 La. 1019, 31 So. 2d 197 (1946); Montgomery v.
Foreman, 410 So. 2d 1160 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982). See also Envirogas Inc. v. Walker
Energy Partners, 641 F. Supp. 1339 (W.D.N.Y. 1986). See also Marcel Planiol, Civil Law
Treatise, Vol. 2, pt. 2, 171 (LSU 1959) (appointed managers cannot be removed except
for legitimate cause, such as breach of trust or incapacity).
172. See Lancaster v. Petroleum Corp. of Del., 491 So. 2d 768 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1986) (operator breached agreement by resigning without giving required 90-day notice).
173. See supra text accompanying note 129.
174. Huggs Inc. v. LPC Energy, Inc., 889 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1989). See Estis v.
Monte Carlo Exploration, Inc., 558 So. 2d 341 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 563 So.
2d 879 (1990) (in action by nonoperator involving loss of lease, operator's conduct measured
by due diligence standard).
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from conducting the operations necessary to maintain those rights. 1 5
3. Nonconsent Operations
The general rule in Louisiana is that, absent an agreement, no
operations can be conducted upon a co-owned lease without the unan-
imous consent of all of the co-owners. 7 6 Most operating agreements
eliminate this potential obstacle to development by providing that under
certain circumstances a party may conduct mineral operations even though
some or all of the remaining co-owners do not consent to the operations.
Most oil companies would be unwilling to drill a well if a non-
consenting party, who assumed none of the financial burden or risks
associated with drilling, could share in the proceeds of production as
soon as its share of costs had been recouped out of production. Thus,
most joint operating agreements provide that the nonconsenting party
will forfeit his right to share in some or all of the production from the
well even after the costs have been recouped. Such a provision is known
as a risk charge or nonconsent penalty.'
7
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Martin Exploration Co.,"' the Louisiana
Supreme Court enforced a provision in an operating agreement that
required a party who did not participate in the drilling of wells to
forfeit his entire interest in the lease. However, acceptance of well cost
payments from a nonoperator that has not timely elected to participate
in a well can result in waiver of the forfeiture. 79
4. Sharing Costs
a. Form of Agreement
Probably the simplest form of operating agreement is the agreement
to share the costs of drilling and operating a well. 8' Although some
common law cases suggest that the nonoperators' agreement to share
in the costs must be in writing,'"' in Louisiana such an agreement may
175. stis, 558 So. 2d 341.
176. See supra text accompanying note 41.
177. See General Am. Oil Co. of Tex. v. Superior Oil Co., 416 So. 2d 251, 257 n.6
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 421 So. 2d 908 (1982).
178. 447 So. 2d 469 (La. 1984).
179. See Crescent Drilling & Dev., Inc. v. Sealexco, Inc., 570 So. 2d 151 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1990), writ denied 575 So. 2d 573 (1991).
180. See Sterling v. McKendrick, 134 So. 2d 655, 658 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
181. See Sonat Exploration Co. v. Mann, 785 F.2d 1232, 1234 n.l (5th Cir. 1986);
see also Huffco Petroleum Corp. v. Massey, 834 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1987) (under Mississippi
law, in the absence of a written operating agreement, a statement that "payment will be
forthcoming" was too ambiguous).
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be oral or implied from the parties' conduct.8 2 In Connette v. Wright,8 3
the Louisiana Supreme Court implied a promise to pay, despite an
explicit refusal to participate, based upon a co-owner's acceptance of
production and opposition to a partition.1u While the court's reasoning
in implying consent in the face of an explicit refusal to participate is
suspect, the result reflects a frequently encountered judicial reluctance
in Louisiana to permit one party to benefit from another party's efforts.
b. Waiver, Ratification and Estoppel
The doctrines of waiver, ratification and estoppel are often employed
to the same end. In Exchange Oil & Gas Corp. v. Great American
Exploration Corp.,'"s the court, without citing Connette, correctly ruled
that under Louisiana law the agreement to pay need not be in writing
and applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to hold a nonoperator
liable for drilling costs upon a showing that the operator relied to his
detriment upon the nonoperator's representation that it would pay its
share of drilling costs. 8 6 The court found that the operator's detriment
was that "it lost the opportunity to gain control of the entire working
interest" and that the nonoperator had the opportunity "to wait until
the drilling was completed and with geological hindsight decide whether
it wished to risk any venture capital."' 87 Some common law cases have
rejected claims of detrimental reliance under similar circumstances. 8
c. AFE's
Oil and gas operating companies often circulate authorizations for
expenditure ("AFE") to advise potential participants of the nature of
the operations and their estimated cost. Many AFE's contain a signature
space preceded by the words: "agreed to and accepted." While no
Louisiana case has addressed the effect of the execution of an AFE,
182. See Caddo Oil Co., Inc. v. O'Brien, 908 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1990) (consent not
implied); Connette v. Wright, 154 La. 1081, 98 So. 674 (1924) (consent implied); Hobbs
v. Central Equip. Rentals, Inc., 382 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 385
So. 2d 785 (1980) (verbal); Sterling v. McKendrick, 134 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1961) (testimony and correspondence); cf. Riddle v. Simmons, 589 So. 2d 89, 93 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1991), writ refused, 592 So. 2d 1316 (1992) (parol evidence admissible to
establish profit sharing of co-owned property).
183. 154 La. 1081, 98 So. 674 (1924).
184. Compare Caddo, 908 F.2d 13 (on similar facts, no implied consent).
185. 789 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1986).
186. The opinion gives no reason why the court relied upon equitable estoppel instead
of oral or implied consent.
187. Exchange Oil, 789 F.2d at 1164.
188. See Huffco Petroleum Corp. v. Massey, 834 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1987); Sonat
Exploration Co. v. Mann, 785 F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. 1986).
19921
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
other jurisdictions have held that it is a question of fact whether, in
the absence of a written operating agreement, the execution of an AFE
alone constitutes an agreement by the nonoperator to share costs.8 9
5. Scope of the Operations
Consent to an operation includes consent to all necessary expen-
ditures; absent a contrary intent, the estimate of the costs in an AFE
is not a limit on expenditures. 90 What constitutes a necessary expenditure
is a question of fact depending upon the intention of the parties as
reflected in their words and deeds and the custom of the industry.' 9'
For instance, in Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 92 the court held that
under Texas law it was a question of fact as to whether sidetracking
operations required the approval of the nonoperators, or whether the
initial consent to drill the well included consent to such operations.
Where the operator deviates in a material way from the procedure set
forth in the AFE, courts have limited the nonoperator's liability because
the nonoperator consents to the AFE procedure and not the material
deviation. Thus, Texas courts have relieved nonoperators from liability
for the costs of a well drilled at a location different from that specified
in the AFE, 193 or for the added costs of a well drilled on a day rate
basis as opposed to the footage basis specified in the AFE.' 94
6. Operator's Standard of Conduct
a. In General
In the actual conduct of drilling and production operations, the
operator is not governed by a fiduciary duty even in those common
law jurisdictions willing to find a joint venture in the face of a dis-
claimer.19' This is due in part to the speculative and risky nature of
189. Compare Sonat, 785 F.2d 1232 (under Mississippi law, no agreement) with G.H.K.
Co. v. Jones Invs., Inc., 748 P.2d 45 (Okla. App. Div. 3 1987) (agreement).
190. Compare M&T, Inc. v. Fuel Resources Dev. Co., 518 F. Supp. 285 (D. Colo.
1981) (nonoperator's liability not limited by AFE) with Forest Oil Corp. v. Superior Oil
Co., 338 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976) (language of operating agreement allowed
operator to overrun initial AFE by only fifty percent).
191. See La. Civ. Code art. 2053.
192. 801 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S. Ct. 1892 (1987).
193. Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
194. Haas v. Gulf Coast Natural Gas Co., 484 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. Corpus
Christi 1972).
195. See, e.g., Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 920, 81 S. Ct. 783 (1960).
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such operations and the fact that the operator ordinarily will share in
any losses occasioned by his bad judgment or honest error. I9 In Sterling
v. McKendrick,'91 the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal stated
in dicta that each participant is liable for his pro rata share unless the
operator is guilty of negligence in the execution of his delegated au-
thority. 9 However, such a simple standard imposes too much respon-
sibility upon the operator by failing to consider the nonoperator's
assumption of risks inherent in drilling operations. In J.E. Crosbie, Inc.
v. King,'99 the Oklahoma Supreme Court succinctly set forth an appro-
priate standard of care, in the absence of a contrary agreement, governing
the operator's conduct of operations:
All of the authorities are agreed that partners assume the risk
of loss that comes from bad judgment .... All that is required
of a managing partner is good faith ... and reasonable skill
and diligence. All partners share equally losses occasioned by
the bad judgment of any one partner. A managing partner is
not liable alone for a loss occasioned by honest error, or by
bad judgment. '°°
Thus, the operator's standard of care should be reasonable skill and
diligence. As long as the operator is not guilty of bad faith, fraud, or
culpable negligence, the nonoperators must share in the losses resulting
from the operator's bad judgment and good faith errors. However, the
parties are free to contractually limit the operator's liability.
b. Gross Negligence
Many agreements provide that the operator shall conduct operations
in a workmanlike fashion, but shall have no liability except for gross
negligence.20 Gross negligence has been defined as the entire absence
of care, or utter disregard of the dictates of prudence, amounting to a
complete neglect of the rights of others. 20 2 Article 3556(13) of the Louis-
iana Civil Code defines gross fault as inexcusable negligence or ignorance
196. See Lane & Boggs, supra note 101, at 223-24.
197. 134 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
198. Id. at 658.
199. 133 P.2d 543 (Okla. 1943).
200. Id. at 546 (citations omitted). See also Arkla Exploration Co. v. Shadid, 710
P.2d 126 (Okla. App. 1985).
201. E.g., Lancaster v. Petroleum Corp. of Del., 491 So. 2d 768 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1986). See also Oryx Energy Co. v. Tatex Energy, 779 F. Supp. 144 (D. Colo. 1991)
(operator only liable for operations conducted in bad faith).
202. Hendry Corp. v. Aircraft Rescue Vessels, 113 F. Supp. 198, 201 (E.D. La. 1953)
(citing Hollander v. Davis, 120 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1941)). See also State v. Vinzant, 200
La. 301, 315, 7 So. 2d 917, 922 (1942) (absence of even slight care and diligence).
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that is nearly equal to fraud. 23 There seems to be little difference between
gross negligence and recklessness. However, ordinary negligence in at-
tending to a critical task has been characterized as gross negligence.0
4
7. Liability to Third Parties
In the absence of a pure agency relationship, the operator will be
liable for the debts it incurs. The liability of nonoperators to third
parties for debts incurred by the operator in the conduct of the operations
will depend upon whether the operating agreement negates the existence
of an agency relationship or partnership. In Sabine Supply Co. v.
Cameron Oil Co.,205 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the non-
operator was not liable for debts contracted by the operator, where the
agreement provided that the operator was not an agent and had no
authority to act for the nonoperator and that any expenses incurred in
the management and supervision of operations would be the operator's
sole responsibility unless the nonoperator consented to same in writing.
In the absence of such a disclaimer, nonoperators were held liable to
third parties on the basis of partnership law with each partner responsible
for his virile share of the partnership debts, irrespective of his percentage
share of the partnership. 206 However, no case has yet addressed the
impact of Mineral Code article 215 on the liability of nonoperators to
third parties in privity with the operator. Undoubtedly, the issue will
turn upon whether the courts apply the law of mandate in spite of
article 215's negation of a partnership.2 7
E. Accounting, Collections and Litigation
1. The Operator's Duty to Account for the Nonoperator's Funds
The operator, by undertaking to manage the affairs of
another,0 8 probably incurs the mandatary's obligation to render an
203. La. Civ. Code art. 3556(13) (1953, redesignated 3506(13) (1991)).
204. See Huggs, Inc. v. LPC Energy, Inc., 889 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1989). See also
Grace-Cajun Oil Co. No. Two v. Damson Oil Corp., 897 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1990) (trial
court found gross negligence in operator's failure to file for higher priced gas).
205. 175 La. 360, 143 So. 327 (1932).
206. Duncan v. Gill, 227 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), writ denied, 255 La.
338, 230 So. 2d 834 (1970) (nonoperator is liable for virile share); Young v. Reed, 192
So. 780 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) (nonoperator liable for virile share of contract debts
regardless of percentage interest in venture); Langston v. Red Iron Drilling Co., 38 F.
Supp. 136 (W.D. La. 1941) (nonoperator liable for virile share of personal injuries).
207. See Boigon, supra note 101, at 5-5 (disclaimer of partnership inconsistent with
intent to create agency). Cf. Davidson v. Enstar Corp., 860 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1988)
(disregarding language of operating agreement to find existence of joint venture preventing
tort liability for nonoperator). Persons who knowingly deal with agents are under an
obligation to inquire as to the extent of an agent's authority and are charged with
constructive notice of the limits of that authority. Herbert v. Langhoff, 185 La. 105, 168
So. 508 (1936).
208. La. Civ. Code art. 2295.
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accounting2m in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.210 The
operator must exercise due diligence in accounting for the nonoperator's
funds, including maintaining the necessary receipts. 21' Initially, the burden
is upon the nonoperator to show the property or funds delivered to the
operator and, upon proof thereof, shifts to the nonoperator to establish
what disposition has been made of the funds. 212
Significantly, an operator who uses the nonoperator's funds for
unintended purposes may be liable to the nonoperator not only for a
return of the funds but for any profits derived therefrom. 23 Where the
operator has failed or refused to use the nonoperator's funds for the
intended purpose, and then becomes insolvent, the nonoperator should
be able to recover those funds so long as they can be identified. 214 If
the funds have been commingled in the operator's general account and
cannot be identified, the nonoperator may be relegated to the status of
an unsecured creditor, although there is some authority for requiring
the funds to be returned to the nonoperator on a constructive trust
theory.2"5 Case law suggests that the nonoperator can recover funds
improperly paid to a third party creditor of the operator only where
said creditor participated in or benefited from the operator's fraud.21 6
2. Compensation or Set-off
a. In General
Where the operator and nonoperator each owe the other money,
compensation, which is identical to the common law concept of set-
off, 217 may take place. 21 1 Compensation occurs by operation of law where
209. Id. art. 3004.
210. See Caddo Oil Co. v. O'Brien, 908 F.2d 13, 17 (5th Cir. 1990) (prudent operator
standard in agreement negated fiduciary duty to render an accounting).
211. See Succession of Desorme, 10 Rob. 474 (La. 1845); Gilmore v. Gilmore, 137
La. 162, 68 So. 395 (1915).
212. See Hodson v. Hodson, 292 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 295
So. 2d 177 (1974).
213. See La. Civ. Code art. 3005; Foreman v. Pelican Stores, 21 So. 2d 64 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1944).
214. See Bloodworth v. Jacobs, 2 La. Ann. 24 (1847); Stetson, Avery & Co. v. Gurney,
17 La. 162 (1841).
215. Compare In re Mahan & Rowsey, Inc., 817 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1987) (nonoperator
entitled to lowest balance in comingled account) and Boyd v. Martin Exploration Co.,
56 B.R. 776 (E.D. La. 1986) with Marple v. Kurzweg, 902 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1990);
Unimobil 84, Inc. v. Spurney, 797 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1986) and In re Latham Exploration
Co., Inc., 83 B.R. 423 (W.D. La. 1988).
216. Boisdore v. Bridgeman, 502 So. 2d 1149, 1155 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987) (knowing
participation in fraudulent scheme); Dohm v. O'Keefe, 458 So. 2d 964 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 460 So. 2d 1046 (1984).
217. In re Delta Energy Resources, Inc., 67 B.R. 8, 10 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986).
218. See La. Civ. Code art. 1893.
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two persons owe each other sums of money that are equally liquidated
and demandable.2 19
The jurisprudence offers various explanations of a liquidated claim,
including those whose correctness is admitted by the debtor and those
for a sum certain or an amount capable of ascertainment by mere
calculation in accordance with accepted legal standards. 20 In Sims v.
Hays,"2 the court held that a disputed debt was not liquidated where
its proof could be along and laborious process.
b. Bankruptcy
The Bankruptcy Code does not affect the right provided by state
law for either an operator or nonoperator to set-off amounts owed to
the debtor against the amounts owed by the debtor. 222 The automatic
stay does not defeat the set-off but simply stays it pending an exami-
nation of the debtor's and the creditor's rights.2 23 In In re Wilson,- 4
the court held that: (a) an operator could exercise its lien rights by
applying the nonoperator's pre-bankruptcy production proceeds to satisfy
its pre-bankruptcy operating expenses; (b) the operator could not use
post-petition production to offset the debtors' pre-petition obligations;
(c) while set-off could take place post-petition, its applicability would
be determined by the state law of co-tenancy until the operating agree-
ment, an executory contract, is accepted; and (d) the portion of the
proceeds that were royalty revenues, as distinguished from working
interest revenues, could not be set off against expenses.
3. Liens
The operator has a contract action to recover the reasonable costs
incurred in connection with operations in which the nonoperator par-
ticipated.25 However, absent agreement to the contrary, the mere failure
219. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. South Excavation, Inc., 480 So. 2d
920 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985), writ denied, 481 So. 2d 1337 (1986); Sliman v. Mahtook,
136 So. 749 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1931). Debts are equally demandable when they are both
mature and subject to payment on demand. FDIC v. Page, 195 So. 629 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1940).
220. Reynaud v. His Creditors, 4 Rob 514 (1843) (correctness admitted); Coburn v.
Commercial Nat'l Bank, 453 So. 2d 597 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 457 So. 2d 681
(La. 1984) (sum certain or capable of ascertainment); Olinde Hardware & Supply Co. v.
Ramsey, 98 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957). See also Sims, 521 So. 2d 730 (general
discussion of liquidated debt).
221. 521 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
222. 11 U.S.C.A. § 553(a) (1979); In re Donato, 17 B.R. 708 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982);
In re Haffner, 12 B.R. 371 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981).
223. In re Terry, 7 B.R. 880 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
224. 69 B.R. 960 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
225. See, e.g., Exchange Oil & Gas Corp. v. Great Am. Exploration Corp., 789 F.2d
1161 (5th Cir. 1986); Sterling v. McKendrick, 134 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
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to pay a proportionate share of the well costs does not cause the
nonoperator to forfeit his interest in the well. The operator is faced
with the tedious task of filing suit, obtaining a money judgment, and
then seeking to execute upon it while the nonoperator receives the
production revenues.
Many operating agreements provide for a lien to run in favor of
the operator or the nonoperator. Any such language ordinarily will be
superfluous because in Louisiana liens are stricti juris, applying only
where, and to the extent, authorized by statute. 6 Thus, courts generally
must look not to the operating agreement, but to the Louisiana Oil,
Gas and Water Wells Lien Act, which grants a lien in favor of anyone
who performs any labor or service or furnishes supplies in connection
with any oil, gas or water well. 227 On the theory that he performs a
service, the operator has the right to a lien on the nonoperator's share
of the mineral lease for the unpaid share of costs owed by the nono-
perator. 28 Similarly, whether a nonoperator is entitled to a lien upon
the operator's interest probably will depend upon whether the nono-
perator is considered to have performed a service.2 29
To perfect a lien under the Act, notice of the lien must be filed
in the public records where the well was drilled within 180 days of the
last service performed, and suit must be brought on the claim within
one year of recordation of said notice. 2" The lien may be enforced by
a writ of sequestration without posting a bond.23 ' Attorney's fees are
recoverable in an action to enforce a lien. 232
4. Security Interests
Louisiana has recently adopted article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, making it easier for parties to an operating agreement to grant
a security interest in production equipment and production to secure
the performance of their obligations. A security interest attaches when:
(a) there is a security agreement 23  signed by the debtor or containing
a description of the property, (b) value has been given, and (c) the
226. E.g., Blazingame v. Anderson, 236 La. 505, 108 So. 2d 105 (1959).
227. La. R.S. 9:4861 (1991).
228. Blazingame v. Anderson, 236 La. 505, 108 So. 2d 105 (1959); Kenmore Oil Co.
v. Delacroix, 316 So. 2d 468 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
229. In Transworld Drilling Co. v. Texas Gen. Petroleum Co., 524 So. 2d 215 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1988), the court held that the validity of a nonoperator's lien is a mixed
question of law and fact.
230. La. R.S. 9:4862, 9:4865 (1991).
231. Id. 9:4866.
232. Caddo Oil Co. Inc. v. O'Brien, 908 F.2d 13, 17 (5th Cir. 1990).
233. A security agreement is an agreement which creates or provides for a security
interest. La. R.S. 10:9-105(1)(L) (Supp. 1992).
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debtor has rights in the collateral.23 4 The security interest is perfected
by filing a financing statementl3 in the parish where the well is located.2 36
Oil and gas reduced to possession may be so encumbered so long as
the financing statement contains a legally sufficient description of the
land from which the production occurs. 2"1 Once the production is sold,
the creditor's security interest ceases to be perfected ten days after the
debtor receives the proceeds unless they remain identifiable. 238
5. Litigation
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, actions arising out
of a breach of an operating agreement must be brought within ten
years.2 39 However, operating agreements sometimes shorten this prescrip-
tive period.2 ° Louisiana courts consistently have upheld agreements that
shorten the statutory period for bringing claims.24' Absent fraud or a
contractual provision, attorney's fees are not recoverable by the pre-
vailing party. 2
V. CONCLUSION
Co-ownership, unitization, and operating agreements each substan-
tially affects the right to conduct oil and gas operations, the liability
for their costs and the right to the profits from them. Although each
category of joint oil and gas operation carries with it different rights
and liabilities, certain generalizations apply to all. The right to conduct
operations depends upon property rights unless the property rights at
issue have been modified by unitization or agreement. The person who
conducts the operations has, at a minimum, the right to recover his
costs out of production before anyone else can share in the profits
therefrom. The right to recover costs in advance of production varies
depending upon whether co-ownership, unitization or agreements are
involved. Once costs have been recovered, each owner has the right to
234. Id. 10:9-203.
235. Id. 10:9-402.
236. See id. 10:9-401, 10:9-402 & comments.
237. Id. 10:9-402(5).
238. See id. 10:9-301(1), 10:9-306(3).
239. Caddo Oil, Inc. v. O'Brien, 908 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1990).
240. Exxon Corp. v. Crosby-Mississippi Resources, Ltd., 775 F. Supp. 969 (S.D. Miss.
1991); Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Hommell, 784 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1989) (operating agree-
ment required suit to be brought within two years).
241. Caddo Oil, 908 F.2d 13; see also Con-Plex Div. of U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Vicon,
Inc., 448 So. 2d 191 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984); Green v. Peoples Benev. Indus. Life Ins.
Co. of La., 5 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941).
242. See La. Civ. Code art. 1958; see also Austin v. Parker, 672 F.2d 508 (5th Cir.
Unit A 1982).
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share in production, either by in kind partition or, under certain cir-
cumstances, by cash balancing for gas production.
The Risk Fee Statute was a step in the right direction in rewarding
operators who take risks in drilling unit wells. The same step should
be taken in the area of co-ownership of mineral leases.
This article should familiarize the practitioner with the various legal
problems that can arise when two or more parties control or participate
in oil and gas operations. Despite the frequency with which such op-
erations occur, the law is unsettled in many respects. The interplay
between the statutes, the jurisprudence, the custom in the industry, and
equity creates interesting legal issues as well as opportunities for creative
lawyers. Recognition of the legal problems inherent in such operations
is the first step toward their solution.

